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PREFACE
After its election in July 1984 New Zealand's Labour
Government embarked on a programme of accelerated economic
liberalisation. Perhaps the most thorough liberalisation
has occurred in the financial market. In mid-1984 the
financial market was heavily regulated under the Prices and
Wages Freeze and other regulations, but just four years
later New Zealand's financial market is one of the least
regulated in the world. In this Research Paper an overview
of some aspects of financial market liberalisation is
presented. The Paper complements other recently published
papers on the same subject.
The author, Mr R L St Hill, is a senior lecturer in the
Department of Agricultural Economics and Marketing.
Professor A C Zwart
DIRECTOR
(vii)

SUMMARY
The main purpose of this paper is to complement other
studies of financial market liberalisation in New Zealand
that have been published recently. The paper provides a
brief summary of the regulatory environments before and
after the election of a Labour Government in 1984. Specific
aspects of the effects of liberalisation that are discussed
include financial deepening, market concentration,
profitability, and market structure. Broadly speaking the
conclusions are that, since 1984, financial deepening has
occurred, neither market concentration nor profitability
have altered very much and some significant changes in
market structure have occurred.
(ix)

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A distinguishing characteristic of economic policy of
the Lange Labour Government, first elected in July 1984 and
now almost half-way through its second term of office, has
been its persistent drive towards removing artificial
impediments to competition in markets. The government has
sought to make markets more contestable, but the speed of
"deregulation" has not been consistent across all markets.
Arguably, the speed of deregulation has been most rapid in
the financial market. At the time the Labour Government
came into office, New Zealand's financial market was the
most highly regulated in the western world, largely as a
result of stringent regulations invoked by the Muldoon
National Government during the Prices and Wages Freeze of
June 1982 to November 1984. In late 1988 New Zealand boasts
one of the least regulated financial markets in the world.
A small number of studies of the causes and effects of
liberalisation of the New Zealand financial market has been
published recently. The most comprehensive is Harper (1986)
in which regulatory policy in the decade prior to 1984 was
surveyed and the causes and effects of reform were studied
within an industrial economics framework. Shorter studies
are Harper and Karacaog1u (1987), Mayes and Hunn (1987) and
Weston (1988). All three studies were generally confined to
microeconomic aspects of the financial market. A review of
liberalisation that also considered some macroeconomic
factors is Spencer and Carey (1988).
Earlier accounts of the factors that led the Government
and its advisers to reject pervasive regulation in favour of
liberalisation can be found in Reserve Bank of New Zealand
(1984, 1986) and Treasury (1984).
The main purpose of this paper is to complement those
studies mentioned above by discussing some particular
aspects of change in the market. These aspects are: i)
financial deepening (an increase in the value of financial
assets held by the public), ii) market concentration, iii)
profitability, and iv) market structure as measured by
institutional shares of deposits and advances. Broadly
speaking the conclusions are that: i) financial deepening
occurred after 1984, ii) market concentration has not
altered significantly since 1984, iii) profitability has
not altered significantly since 1984, and iv) there have
been some significant changes in market structure as
measured by institutional shares of deposits and advances.
A brief review of
and after ,July 1984 is
paper.
financial market regulation prior to
also provided in Section 2 of this
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CHAPTER 2
REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS BEFORE AND AFTER JULY 1984
2.1 The Regulatory Framework Prior to July 1984
The major theme in financial market regulation prior to
1984 was the maintenance of control over the activities of
groups of financial institutions by creating specific market
segments. The main means of segmentation were entry
restrictions (that were most stringent in the trading bank
and savings bank segments) and direct controls on both
prices (such as interest on deposit regulations, mortgage
interest rate regulations and the "thirty day rule" that
forbade trading banks from paying interest on short term
deposits) and on portfolio composition (such as various
reserve ratios, regulations on terms of fixed deposits,
priority lending guidelines and restrictions on savings
institutions' transactions with "commercial" depositors and
borrowers). Details of these and other regulatory
instruments can be found in Deane, Nichnll and Smith (1983)
and case studies of their effects on balance sheet growth of
groups of the main deposit-taking institutions appear in
Jeyasubramaniam (1981), Nicholl and King (1985) and St Hill
(1988, Ch 5).
Most of the direct controls could be manipulated by the
Minister of Finance or the Executive Council (Cabinet plus
the Governor General) under powers enshrined in the Reserve
Bank Amendment Act (1936) and subsequent amendments and
various other Acts, including the Economic Stabilisation Act
1948 (repealed in 1987). Consequently, control of monetary
aggregates was pursued via direct means and governments made
little effort either to promote or use secondary markets in
government debt. (In part this could have been because
direct controls enabled governments to force "captive"
institutions to hold government debt at below-market
interest rates - in mid-1984 the captive institutions held
around 85 percent of the internal government debt not held
by the government itself or by government-owned
corporations, but by mid-1988 the same institutions, now
freed from statutory requirements to hold government
securities, held under 50 percent of the internal debt.)
In the early 1970s it became clear that direct controls
were encouraging disintermediation (a transfer of deposits
from highly-regulated financial institutions to less-
regulated institutions). By severely restricting the
activities of trading banks, savings banks and building
societies, governments had unwittingly aided the development
of new financial instruments. Solicitors' nominee companies
were first established in 1969 and facilitated the growth of
the private mortgage market. (The first full year for which
published data are available is 1976/77: solicitors' nominee
companies were the source of finance for nearly 11.5 percent
- 3 -
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of all new mortgages by value. This was a larger share than
that for trading and savings banks combined, for building
societies or for life insurance offices.) Impetus for the
growth of this market was given by deposit interest rate
regulations imposed on M3 institutions and buoyant demand
for loans during the commodity price boom of the early
1970's. At this time the commercial bill market also
expanded rapidly: from about $1 million in bills outstanding
at the end of March 1970 to over $100 million and over $200
million at the end of March 1973 and March 1975
respectively. Finance companies also experienced very rapid
growth in the early 1970's. At the end of March 1970 their
share of M3 deposits was around 3.4 percent and by 1973 it
was around 5.6 percent. Generally speaking, the finance
companies were less regulated than the other M3 institutions
and, during the latter half of the period March 1972 to
March 1976, they benefitted from a positive margin with
respect to other M3 institutions under deposit interest rate
regulations: at the end of March 1976 finance companies held
8.3 percent of total M3 deposits.
In March 1976 the Muldoon National Government revoked
the deposit interest rate regulations and began relaxing a
number of other direct controls. Perhaps the most
significant actions by the Government, apart from relaxing
most interest rate controls were: i) reducing the minimum
term for trading bank transferable certificates of deposit
from three months to thirty days in March 1978, and allowing
them to fully participate in the commercial bill market a
month later; and ii) progressively allowing savings banks to
directly compete with other institutions for term deposits.
Nicholl (1977) observed that the changes in policy left New
Zealand with one of the worlds' least regulated financial
markets, although this must be qualified by noting that
exchange controls curbed international financial
transactions.
Removal of direct controls came to an abrupt end in
November 1981 when all financial institutions were required
to notify proposed increases in lending interest rates to
the Reserve Bank prior to their implementation. The
Minister of Finance directed the Bank to object to most
notifications, effectively imposing a "freeze" on lending
rates. This action was a response to rising nominal
interest rates (that reflected rising inflation). In June
1982 regulations on deposit interest rates were invoked as
part of a Prices and Wages Freeze. These were revoked in
November 1983 and replaced almost immediately by mortgage
rate regulations. In May 1984 non-mortgage lending rates
were regulated and, a month later, deposit interest rate
regulations were reinvoked. During 1983 and early 1984
reserve requirements for trading banks, finance companies
and building ~'ocieties were increased. Indeed, the Minister
of Finance tried to make it impossible for the trading banks
to meet their reserve requirements, by setting the target
level of free reserves equal to minus $50 million in March
and April 1984 and minus $100 million in July 1984.
- 5 -
It is noteworthy that the interventionist fervour of the
Minister of Finance during the period November 1981 to July
1984 was quite incongruous when set beside progressive
liberalisation that was occurring elsewhere, most notably in
the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia.
2.2 Causes of Liberalisation After 1984
It is not clear that Sir Robert Muldoon, as Minister of
Finance, was always predisposed to direct intervention in
the financial market (see, for example, Muldoon, 1985).
Certainly his approach between early 1976 and late 1981
indicated that he and the government he led were prepared to
ease controls. Furthermore, a "deregulation" sentiment had
been building up in the National caucus for some time (see
James, 1986, Ch 1). Thus, to some extent, 1981-1984 was an
aberration and resulted from financial market policy being
hostage to Muldoon's attempt to wring inflation and
inflationary expectations out of the economy. At the risk
of trivial ising policy at that time, it could be said that
the basic approach was to temporarily outlaw price and
income inflation, supported by restraint on the growth of
monetary and credit aggregates (but not by restraint on
government deficit spending).
It is now history that in. mid-July 1984, after calling
an early election (hoping to improve on his Government's
slim majority in Parliament), Sir Robert Muldoon suffered a
landslide defeat. At least some New Zealanders had rejected
"interventionism".
It is also now history that something of a
constitutional crisis developed between the date of the
election and the time when warrants were issued to ministers
in the new government. There had been a sizeable outflow of
foreign currency just prior to the election and devaluation
became inevitable. The outgoing prime minister ignored the
incoming prime minister's advice to devalue. According to
David Lange:
" the first few days of being in government - even
before we were sworn in - determined the entire course
of this government ... It was a very quick series of
deci~ions, compared with the normal three-year time
scale. They were taken between the Monday and the
Wednesday of that first week, before we were first
sworn in By the Wednesday we had the
devaluation (T)here were certain inexorable
outcomes. They were that we would float the dollar
(and that it was) absolutely illogical to carryon
with an eastern European-style regulatory structure
" (National Business Review, 11 July 1986.)
- 6 -
For two versions of the events of those few days see Douglas
and Callan (1987, Ch 5) and Muldoon (1985, Ch 12).
The Lange government's approach to controlling inflation
was to restrict the rate of growth of monetary and credit
aggregates by aggressively marketing government debt.
Significant features were the funding of the domestic budget
deficit by selling government securities within New Zealand
and a reduction in the amount of deficit spending by
government. Direct controls on financial institutions
therefore had little relevance and many were dispensed with
during the first six months of the new government's term.
Interest rate regulations were abolished first and, in
February 1985, all compulsory reserve ratios were abolished
(leaving only the Post Office Savings Bank with a voluntary
ratio). On the first business day in March 1985 the New
Zealand dollar was "clean" floated (exchange controls had
been removed in December 1984). By November 1985 the
government had announced plans to remove entry restrictions
in commercial banking and since that time it has amended a
number of Acts that segmented the financial market.
Despite David Lange's view quoted above, it is hard to
believe that the events of the crisis days after the
election influenced policy direction, although they almost
certainly influenced the speed and sequencing of regulatory
reforms. There are a number of reasons for this.
First, it had been clear as far back as the early 1970s
that direct controls were encouraging disintermediation.
This was a catalyst in the 1976-1981 liberalisation
programme. Furthermore, it had been observed overseas that
technological advances had forced changes in market
structure. For example, Kane (1984) asserted that computer
technologies had made it possible for financial institutions
to encroach on each others' territories. He noted that the
process of financial market liberalisation in America had
occurred after the regulatory framework had broken down
owing to "structural arbitrage". Structural arbitrage
occurred when financial institutions used technological
advances to reorganise themselves so as to lighten their
regulatory burdens. In the New Zealand context the
development of direct credit and debit systems, credit and
debit cards and "sweep" accounts could be considered as
structural arbitrage. Therefore there had been underlying
pressure for a change in the regulatory framework for some
time.
Second, as far as monetary control was concerned,
government advisers had little faith in direct controls as
effective instruments. This was clear from Reserve Bank
annual reports, especially those from about 1980 to 1985 and
from Treasury (1984) and Reserve Bank of New Zealand (1984
and 1986). Tpe main problem with direct controls appeared
to be that they could not reliably influence growth of the
balance sheets of financial institutions, possibly because
- 7 -
of the conflict between (macro) monetary policy objectives
and (micro) equity objectives. (It appeared that
governments wanted to slow down the rate of growth of the
monetary aggregates without upsetting market structure). St
Hill (1988, Chs 5 and 6) concluded that most direct
interventions between 1970 and 1985 had no systematic
effects on either: i) the rate of growth of deposits or
advances of the major deposit-taking institutions; or ii)
market structure in terms of institutional shares of total
deposits or advances.
Third, it was clear before the election in 1984 that a
Labour government would make less use of direct controls as
instruments of monetary policy. Upon election to leadership
of the Parliamentary Labour Party in February 1983, David
Lange appointed Roger Douglas as his finance spokesperson.
Douglas' views on economic policy were by then well-known,
after he had published an "alternative Budget" and a book
(Douglas, 1980) in which he revealed his attitudes to
economic policy. Between early 1983 and the 1984 election
Douglas was assertively supported, not only by Mr Lange, but
by other caucus members like Geoffrey Palmer, Mike Moore,
David Caygill and Richard Prebble (see James, 1986, Chs 8
and 9). Therefore it is hardly surprising that, as Minister
of Finance, Roger Douglas set about reforming the regulatory
framework (with help from two Associate Ministers, Mr
Caygill and Mr Prebble).
2.3 The Regulatory Framework After July 1984
The regulatory framework that has evolved since July
1984 has two main features: i) an emphasis on removing
artificial segmentation and engendering contestability
(Harper and Karacaoglu 1987, call this the "principle of
effective competition"); and ii) prudential management via
capital requirements and reporting standards.
With respect to the first feature, undoubtedly the most
important reform was to open up commercial banking. Any
institution can now apply to the Reserve Bank for a licence
to call itself a registered bank provided it satisfies the
following criteria:
(a) Issued capital of at least $30 million, at least
$15 million paid up;
(b) Main line of business accepting deposits and making
loans;
(c) Expertise in the
good standing in
conduct of banking business and
the financial community;
(d) A well-spread shareholding or internal controls to
prevent undue loan concentration; and
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(e) A willingness to cooperate with the Reserve Bank in
all its functions, including prudential management.
no restriction on the number
is there any time limit on
fifteen registered banks
that existed in 1984.
The Government has placed
of licences it will issue nor
applications. There are now
including the four trading banks
Another important reform was opening up the payments
system to potential competition. This occurred when the
Reserve Bank became willing to open settlement accounts for
any institution (although at this time the trading banks and
Post Bank. and three newly-registered banks are the only
institutions with settlement accounts).
The prudential management system
finalised but characteristics that are
include:
has not yet been
now well established
(a) A reliance on reporting
means of early warning
problems;
to
of
the Reserve Bank as a
solvency or liquidity
(b) A determination to manage financial institution
failure rather than prevent it (in this regard the
Government has withdrawn lender of last resort
facilities from trading banks and is withdrawing
deposit guarantees from trustee banks and Post
Bank);
(c) A determination to adopt capital adequacy standards
along similar lines to those recommended by the
Bank for International Settlements; and
(d) Acceptance of Reserve Bank responsibility for
maintaining liquidity of the financial system as a
whole.
(See for example,
1987b).
Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 1987a and
With respect to monetary policy, direct controls have
been replaced by open market operations as the main policy
instrument. This has brought New Zealand into line with
practice in many other western economies.
CHAPTER 3
EFFECTS OF LIBERALISATION
3. 1 Introduction
In this section some effects of financial market
liberalisation are considered. First, some evidence is
presented that suggests that financial deepening has
occurred since 1984. This could contribute to future
economic growth. Second, the effects of liberalisation on
market structure, as revealed by concentration ratios, are
discussed. It appears that there have not been any
significant changes in overall market concentration since
1984. Nor have there been significant changes in
profitability. Third, the effects of liberalisation on
market structure, as revealed by changes in institutional
shares of deposits and advances are discussed. It is clear
that there have been some fairly substantial shifts in
market structure measured on these bases.
3.2 Financial Deepening
Financial deepening is a term used to describe the
increasing importance of financial assets, such as bank
deposits, in an economy over time. Financial deepening is
part of the process of evolution of financial institutions,
services and instruments as an economy develops. This
evolutionary process is usually referred to as financial
development.
Systematic studies of relationships between financial
development and economic development were first published in
Goldsmith (1955) and Gurley and Shaw (1955). Since that
time it has become widely acknowledged that increasing
sophistication in financial markets enhances prospects for
economic development. A commonly used indicator of the
depth of the financial market is the ratio of a monetary
aggregate to gross domestic product (or change in a monetary
aggregate to change in gross domestic product). Some
indicators of financial deepening in New Zealand are set out
in Table 1. Data for Ml and M3 are averages for each
financial year and data for changes in Ml and M3 are March
differences. It is clear from the M3 ratios that, from
1984/85 to 1987/88 financial deepening occurred. Also, the
ratio of the change in Ml to change in Gross Domestic
Product rose substantially in 1985/86 and again in 1987/88.
On the whole, Table I indicates rapid deepening of the
financial market.
It might be argued that at least some of the apparent
deepening was the result of the public transferring deposits
from non~traditional financial institutions back to the
traditional financial institutions where they were
- 9 -
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Table 1: Financial Deepening in New Zealand, 1981/82 to 1987/88
Year Ml/GDPxlOO M3/GDPxl00 ti'fl/~DPxl00 L':£ft3/~DPxl00
1981/82 9.8 54.7 8.8 44.5
1982/83 9.3 59.7 3.8 62.6
1983/84 9.3 56.6 7.8 78.3
1984/85 8.8 60.2 2.0 U5.8
1985/86 8.5 65.7 12.0 U7.0
1986/87 8.6 66.2 10.1 67.1
1987/88(3) 11.8 72.1 50.1 150.8
Notes:
(I) Ml comprises notes and coin in the hands of the public and
transactions balances (cheque or call deposits) with registered
banks, savings institutions and financial corporations.
(2) M3 comprises Ml plus other funds (mainly term deposits) with
registered banks, savings institutions and financial corporations.
(3) There is a sharp discontinuity in the Ml series in April 1987 when
EFTPOS balances were included for the first time.
1
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originally held (reintermediation) after interest rate
regulations were lifted in 1984. Although this is a
possibility, it should be emphasised that the definitions
of money now used in New Zealand are much wider than the
earlier ones and embrace both the more traditional
institutions such as commercial and savings banks and other
institutions such as finance companies and
merchant/investment banks.
Some impressions of the degree of reintermediation can
be gained from Table 2 in which data on sources of finance
of registered mortgages are presented. It is evident from
this table that: i) the proportions of mortgages and their
value sourced from producer enterprises and solicitors'
nominee companies and government all fell after 1983/84 and
it appears that the proportions sourced from the "other"
category also fell; and ii) the proportions of mortgages
and their value sourced from trading banks, trustee banks,
building societies and other financial intermediaries
generally rose after 1983/84. This evidence implies that
spme reintermediation occurred after 1983/84 but of course,
data in the table only record part of the flow of lending
and do not capture any behaviour on the funding side of
intermediation (see Section 3.4 for some evidence on the
funding side). Some of the adjustment in sources of finance
for mortgages undoubtedly reflects removal of compulsory
reserve ratios in February 1985..
Table 2: Sources of Finance of Mortgages Registered, 1981/82 to 1987/88
Trading Banks Trustee Banks Building Societies Other Financial
Intermediaries
Year Number Share Amount Share Number Share Amount Share Number Share Amount Share Number Share Amount Share
of $m of of $m of of $m of of $m of
Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Total
% % % % % % % %
1981/82 51,257 25.6 80.7 2.3 21,594 10.8 371. 7 10.5 12,760 6.4 259.3 7.3 20,431 10.2 658.4 18.6 I-'
~
1982/83 34,821 21.0 37.9 1.1 13,875 8.4 132.7 3.7 10,110 6.1 227.9 6.4 27,219 12.8 768.2 21.6
1983/84 37,979 21.2 43.6 1.1 16,798 9.4 90.5 2.3 9,862 5.5 243.6 6.1 22,832 12.7 957.9 23.9
1984/85 38,247 20.6 57.1 1.3 18,937 10.2 101.9 2.4 12,423 6.7 308.7 7.2 20,160 10.9 950.6 22.1
1985/86 38,757 20.8 76.7 1.4 14,789 7.9 97.6 1.8 9,652 5.2 320.4 5.8 25,244 13.6 1,546.5 27.9
1986/87 54,900 27.8 93.8 1.5 21,179 10.7 181.9 2.9 14,816 7.5 640.6 10.1 24,574 12.5 1,822.6 28.8
1987/88(1) 27,828 23.5 110.3 2.4 13,678 11.6 157.9 3.4 9,499 8.0 383.2 8.2 16,721 14.1 1,877.5 40.2
Table 2 (cont'd)
Producer. Enterprises Solicitors' Nominee Companies Government Other
Year Number Share Amount Share Number Share Amount Share Number Share Amount Share Number Share Amount Share
of $m of of $m of of $m of of $m of
Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Total
% % % % % % % %
1981/82 7,300 3.6 210.2 5.9 22,843 11.4 513.8 14.5 39,918 19.9 812.0 22.9 24,265 12.1 639.9 18.0
1982/83 6,445 3.9 248.9 7.0 24,338 14.7 591.8 16.6 31,568 19.0 831.3 23.3 23,623 14.2 724.8 20.3
1983/84 6,324 3.5 231.7 5.8 27,105 15.1 738.3 18.4 35,485 19.8 987.0 24.6 22,737 12.7 721.9 18.0
1984/85 6,462 3.5 295.4 6.9 30,126 16.2 772.4 18.0 34,903 18.8 1,040.1 24.2 24,543 13.2 766.4 17.9 .....w
1985/86 5,611 3.0 284.2 5.1 25,282 13.6 845.6 15.3 46,840 25.1 1,590.5 28.7 20,122 10.8 772.3 14.0
1986/87 5,714 2.9 317.6 5.0 21,350 10.8 911.4 14.4 37,851 19.2 1,271. 1 20.1 16,870 8.6 1,091.1(2) 17.2
1987/88(1) 3,654 3.1 197.9 4.2 11,752 9.9 558.7 12.0 26,592 22.4 745.2 15.9 8,753 7.4 643.5 13.7
Number
200,418
165,999
179,122
185,801
186,297
197,254
118,474
TOTAL
Amount ($m)
3,546
3,564
4,015
4,293
5,535
6,330
4,675
Notes:
(1) Seven months to October 1987.
(2) There were some very large mortgages raised overseas in this year.
Source: Department of Statistics, Monthly Abstract of Statistics, various.
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3.3 Market Concentration
Harper and Karacaoglu (1987) noted an apparent lack of
concern on the part of policy makers about the possibility
of increased concentration in a deregulated financial
services industry. They suggested that this was explained
by the fact that policy makers were more concerned with
contestability than with ensuring that a large number of
firms existed. Indeed, as Harper and Karacaoglu pointed
out, this was explicitly stated in Reserve Bank of New
Zealand (1986, pl05). Nevertheless it is still instructive
to study data on market concentration.
The most comprehensive data on financial market
concentration can be found in Department of Statistics
(1985) and relate to 1983/84. Unfortunately, this
publication is the first and latest so cannot be used in the
present analysis. For the purposes of this paper,
concentration data have been prepared using Francis,
Allison, Simes and Company (1984, 1985) and KPMG Peat
Marwick (1986, 1988), hereafter referred to as FAS and PM.
The reason for using two sources was that FAS ceased
publication in 1985 and PM commenced in 1986.
The two most commonly used measures of market
concentration are the N-firm concentration ratio, which is
the percentage market share of the largest N firms in the
market, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman· index, which is the sum
of squared market shares for all sellers in the industry.
For discussion of these indices and their limitations see
Scherer (1980). Concentration data based on total tangible
assets (of surveyed institutions) were computed using FAS
and PM and are set out in Table 3. It should be noted that
the concentration data for 1985 are different for FAS and
PM. The main reason is that FAS is based on balance sheets
as at 31 March of each year or the closest balance date to
31 March each year, whereas PM is based on balance dates
falling in each calendar year. Also, the PM survey covers
fewer institutions (60 in PM, 1986) compared to FAS (75 in
FAS, 1985).
The impression conveyed by data in Table 3 is that
concentration has not altered much overall given the
institutions surveyed (see row "Table Aggregate"). However,
opening up commercial banking has obviously had a
significant impact on concentration in that sector. It will
be interesting to see what happens to concentration in this
sector over the next few years.
Itis not clear why opening up the financial sector to
potential competition has not reduced concentration. High
concentration in a contestable market is often indicative of
economies of scale, but in financial markets this is
probably not the case. The evidence from (mainly United
States) empirical research on scale economies indicates that
there are no significant scale economies in banking, after a
relatively small minimum efficient scale is reached (see,
for example, surveys by Benston, 1972; Gilbert, 1984; and
Table 3: Concentration Ratios in the Financial Market
Year 1984(1) 1985(1) 1985(2) 1987(2)
Class of Institution Four-Firm(5) Herf(6) Four-Firm(5) Herf(6) Four-Firm(5) Herf(6) Four-Firm(5) Herf(6)
Trading Banks 100 0.347 100 0.360 100 0.289 100 0.314
Other Registered Banks (3) 76 0.241
All Registered Banks 76 0.195
Private Savings Banks (4) 100 0.271 100 0.280 100 0.378 100(7) 0.502(7)
Trustee Banks 68 0.180 68 0.170 68 0.170 71 0.210
All Savings Banks 68 0.183 69 0.187 69 0.182 76 0.212
Finance Companies t Merchant I-'
c.n
and Investment Banks 35 0.050 23 0.041 36 0.059 44 0.082
Building Societies 89 0.280 90 0.300 100 0.410 100 0.615
TABLE AGGREGATE 50 0.088 51 0.100 53 0.084 48 0.080
--
Notes:
(1) Francis, Allison, Symes and Company. Based on data as at 31 March or closest balance date to 31 March.
(2) KAMa Peat Marwick. Based on data as at balance dates during each calendar year.
(3) Registered banks came into being on 1 April 1987.
(4) By 1987 two private savings banks had been absorbed by their parent trading banks.
(5) Four-firm concentration ratio based on share of total tangible assets of the institutions surveyed.
(6) Herfindahl-Hirschman index computed as sum of squared market shares of all institutions surveyed.
(7) Two banks only.
Sources: Francis, Allison, Simes and Company (1984, 1985).
KPMG Peat Marwick (1986" 1988).
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Greenbaum, 1967). Therefore, economies of scale are
unlikely to be the cause of concentration. However, it has
recently been noted by Edwards (1986) and Federal Reserve
Bank of New York (1986) in the United states and by Harper
(1986) in New Zealand, that economies of scope are
substantial in the financial services industry. (Economies
of scope arise when a single firm can produce a given level
of output of multiple products in joint production at lower
average total cost than a combination of individual firms
each producing a single product.) If this is true, then
removing the sources of artificial segmentation of the
financial market could be expected to result in increased
concentration over time.
The existence of economies of scope does not mean that
concentration is necessarily something to be welcomed.
There is a substantial body of empirical research in the
United States that suggests that concentration is associated
with lack of competition (see Heggestad, 1979), although it
should be acknowledged that most of these studies applied to
regulated (that is, largely non-contestable) markets. It is
not possible to include detailed consideration of changes in
the degree of competition since 1984 in this paper.
However, the studies by Harper (1986) and Spencer and Carey
(1988) make it clear that there is a bigger range of
financial products available now.
3.4 Profitability
As far as profitability is concerned, it appears that
most institutions have achieved some healthy profit
performances since 1984. Some data on after-tax operating
profits are set out in Table 4. How much the profits arise
because of concentration is not clear. Profits during the
prices and wages freeze were quite high because deposit
interest rate regulations brought down the average cost of
deposits sooner than mortgage interest regulations brought
down the average return on loans (mainly because interest
rates on loan agreements were reviewed infrequently and the
mortgage interest rate regulations applied immediately to
new mortgages but only upon review to existing mortgages).
Generally, profit increases were smaller in 1985 and 1986
than in 1984 but picked up again substantially in 1987. The
latter result might be a reflection of the fact that, as
interest rates on funding for financial institutions fell
during 1987, reductions in interest rates on existing loans
were lagged (by virtue of review clauses in loan
agreements).
In terms of after tax profit, expressed as a percentage
of total tangible assets, there were no significant
increases between 1984 and 1987 although there was a large
increase in finance company profitability between 1986 and
1987. It is noteworthy however, that compared with
commercial banks in Australia, the United States and much of
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Table 4: After-Tax Profits of Financial Institutions, 1984 to 1987(1)
1984(2) Profit Increase in Profit
Over Previous Year
$m %
Trading Banks
Best Performer 53.8 132.1
Worst Performer 19.7 -6.6
Sector 166.0 1.1 68.9
Savings Banks
Best Performer 7.4 74.8
Worst Performer 0.2 -31.1
Sector 32.2 0.5 14.2
Finance Companies
Best Performer 9.8 112.0 (3)
Worst Performer 0.2 -46.1
Sector 52.0 1. 2 41. 7
Merchant and Investment Banks
Best Performer 4.9 320.8
Worst Performer 0.3 -40.7
Sector 22.2 1.1 69.5
Building Societies
Best Performer 4.5 n.a.
Worst Performer 0.4 n.a.
Sector 16.4 1.3 n. a.
1985
Trading Banks
Best Performer 78.2 39.1
Worst Performer 22.7 -4.0
Sector 222.9 1. 0 23.4
Savings Banks
Best Performer 9.3 94.1
Worst Performer 0.4 -49.7
Sector 36.4 0.5 23.4
Finance Companies
Best Performer 13.7 356.4
Worst Performer 0.2 -94.1
Sector 62.0 1.0 -18.8
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1985 cont'd
Merchant and Investment Banks
Best Performer 6.5 (4)
Worst Performer -1.6 (5)
Sector 29.3 0.8 17.8
Building Societies
Best Performer 5.9 37.9
Worst Performer 0.5 -45.0
Sector 13.9 1.0 -15.2
1986
Trading Banks
Best Performer 84.3 59.0
Worst Performer 36.1 -29.4
Sector 239.7 1.1 12.4
Savings Banks
Best Performer 10.7 150.8
Worst Performer -14.2 (6)
Sector 18.4 0.5 49.4
Finance Companies
Best Performer 8.9 (7)
Worst Performer -4.0 (8)
Sector 43.4 0.8 17.9
Merchant and Investment Banks
Best Performer 31.8 (9)
Worst Performer -4.5 (10)
Sector 115.9 1.4 93.1
Building Societies
Best Performer 11.2 86.7
Worst Performer 0.1 -40.4
Sector 23.4 1.2 44
1987
Trading Banks
Best Performer
Worst Performer
Sector
other Registered Banks
Best Performer
Worst Performer
Sector
other Savings Institutions
Best Performer
Worst Performer
Sector
125.8
36.4
314.0 1.1
45.2
-1.6
102.1 1.1
25.8
0.3
69.3 0.7
44.8
0.8
29.6
688.8
(11)
84.0
(12)
-38.8
94.1
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1987 cont'd
Finance Companies
Best Performer
Worst Performer
Sector
Merchant and Investment Banks
Best Performer
Worst Performer
Sector
Notes:
15.5
-1.6
66.5 1.4
33.5
-1.5
134.0 1. 6
(13)
-62.6
52.5
(14)
(15)
89.0
Underlined figures are operating profit after tax expressed as a percentage
of total tangible assets.
n.a. = not available
(I) The surveys upon which data in this table are based were not consistent
in coverage of firms between years. Consequently, the table should be
considered as indicative only.
(2) Based on Francis, Allison, Simes ffild Company (1985).
(3) Approximate only.
(4) A loss of $0.2m became a profit of $1.0m.
(5) A profit of $I.9m became a loss of $I.6m.
(6) A profit of $5.6m became a loss of $14.2m.
(7) A loss of $11.3m became a profit of $5.3m.
(8) A profit of $9.4m became a loss of $4.0m.
(9) A loss of $O.3m became a profit of $2.Im.
(10) A profit of $1.9m becmne a loss of $4.5m.
(11) A profit of $2.5m became a loss of $1.6m.
(12) A loss of $O.2m becmne a profit of $5.0m.
(13) A loss of $4.2m became a profit of $4.2m.
(14) A loss of $O.3m became a profit of $7.6m.
(I5) A profit of $1.3m became a loss of $1.5m.
Source: KPMG Peat Marwick, 1986, 1987, 1988.
- 20 -
continental Western Europe, returns on total assets of the
trading b~nks are quite high (see Walsh, 1983). Using Peat
Marwick data for Australia in 1987, after tax profit
expressed as a percentage of total tangible assets was about
0.7 for trading banks, 0.5 for savings institutions, 0.7 for
finance companies and also 0.7 for merchant and investment
banks. Thus New Zealand financial institutions appear to
have been considerably more profitable then their Australian
counterparts in 1987.
The profit results set out in Table 4 are broadly
consistent with those of the 1986-87 Enterprise Survey
(Department of Statistics, 1988). For the banking (trading
banks and savings banks) industry profitability, as measured
by the ratio of pre-tax net profit to total income, was 12.7
percent. This compares with 13.5 percent in 1985/86 and
12.0 percent in 1982/83.
Finally, the effects of the sharemarket "crash" in late
1987 have not been reflected in data in Table 4. However a
number of smaller finance and contributory mortgage
companies have been placed in receivership during 1988.
Some annual reports for 1988 have been published and the
general impression is that most financial institutions are
still recording relatively high profitability. There is
also indirect evidence that profitability is being
maintained. In Table 5 markups ·of groups of financial
institutions are set out. For registered banks (the four
trading banks and eleven other licenced commercial banks)
the markup on average cost of funds in June 1988 was 30
percent; for savings institutions (mainly trust banks and
building societies) it was 62 percent; and for financial
corporations (mainly finance companies and merchant and
investment banks) it was 28 percent. Markups of the savings
institutions and financial corporations were higher in June
1988 than they were a year earlier (there are no 1987 data
available for registered banks).
The large markup of savings institutions can be partly
explained by the fact that some 30 percent of their deposits
pay less than 10 percent per year interest; for registered
banks the proportion is 15 percent; and for financial
corporations the proportion is only one percent. Also,
savings institutions have slightly higher operating expenses
than other financial institutions because they have
extensive retail branch networks and smaller average deposit
balances.
Table 5:
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Markups OI Financial Institutions, June 1988
Registered banks
Weighted avo cost of funds
Weighted avo return on loans
Difference
Markup
Savings institutions
Weighted avo cost of funds
Weighted avo return on loans
Difference
Markup
Financial corporations
Weighted avo cost of funds
Weighted avo return on loans
Difference
Markup
At June 1987 markups were:
Registered banks
Savings institutions
Financial corporations
13.2 percent
17.1 percent
3.9
30 percent
10.7 percent
17.3 percent
6.6
62 percent
15.1 percent
19.3 percent
4.2
28 percent
?
48 percent
26 percent
Source: Based on data in Reserve Bank Bulletin, Vol 51,
No 3, Tables Dl, D2 and 15, adjusted for
author's estimates of foreign interest rates.
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3.5 Institutional Shares of Deposits and Advances
The degree of concentration of financial institutions is
one dimension of market structure: a further dimension is
the composition of deposits and advances outstanding in the
market. In this section, some observations on the
consequences of liberalisation for the composition of
deposits and advances outstanding are made.
The first observations relate to the distribution of
deposits, broadly defined to include notes and coin,
commercial bills, government stock and accumulated funds of
life insurance offices. Relevant data are set out in Table
6. For comparison purposes data for 1970, 1984 and 1987 are
presented. The most significant change in the composition
of deposits occurred in the trading bank segment between
1984 and 1987: the trading bank share increased by 13.4
percentage points to almost 42 percent of total deposits.
Indeed, the trading banks were the only institutions to
record an increase in share between 1984 and 1987, apart
from commercial bills. Therefore, it would appear that
trading banks gained most from any reintermediation that
occurred after mid-1984. It is noteworthy that the finance
companies' share remained static between 1984 and 1987 after
growing by 10.1 percent between 1970 and 1984. It is
possible that removal of interest rate regulations in 1984
enabled trading banks to rapidly expand, but the fact is
that the trading banks' share of deposits also grew between
1970 and 1984, albeit at a slower rate.
A problem with the data in Table 6 is that they do not
cover the first year of operation of the new registered
banks. Unfortunately, owing to changes in Reserve Bank
definitions of monetary aggregates and deletion of certain
tables from the Bank's quarterly statistical bulletin, it is
not possible to update Table 6 to 1988. However it is
possible to make some assessment of the effects of
registered banks by referring to Table 7. Data in this
table conform with the Reserve Bank's new definitions of
monetary aggregates.
It appears from Table 7 that the advent of registered
banks has had some effect on the composition of M3 funding
between 1987 and 1988. The share of thei r "other funds" out
of total M3 .has increased significantly from about 41
percent to 53 percent. Another significant change in
composition was that savings institutions' other funds fell
from 34.1 percent in 1981 to 19.2 percent in 1988. This
rather dramatic result might partly reflect the fact that
deregulation of the activities of trustee banks and building
societies lagged behind that of some other market segments
(for example, the Trustee Bank Amendment Act was not passed
until mid-1988 and did not come into effect until
1 October). Also, private savings banks are now included
with registered banks for statistical purposes.
Table 6: Distribution of Deposits, Selected Years(l)
As at 31 March (2) 1970 1984 Change in 1987 Change in
Type of Deposit Amount Share Rank Amount Share Rank Share 1970-84 Amount Share Rank Share 1984-87
till % $III % %points $1Il % %points
Notes and Coin 169 3.7 8 652 2.4 10 -1.3 868 2.1 9 -0.3
Trading Banks - demand 595) 7ii8 12.9) 173 2,420) - '28 B.9) ?,-. 2 -4.0) '7 T7)3 5,208) /,6 1 10.9 J,.J. 17 104 41.7 1 +13.5
- fixed 203) ., 4.41 .. 19.2) ~o. 14.8) 1~~67) .,,),j •
Private Savings Banks - demand 166) 727 3.6) 7.1 5 373) 770 1.4) 2 .-, B -2.2) -4.3 257l 436 1.1 10 -1. 7
- fixed 161) J . 3.5) ~'-'7" 1. 5) .0 -2.0) 179).)1. I
Trustee Banks - demand 312) F? 6.8) - . 4 810) ~ 01' 3.0) 11 1 4 -3.8) 1.7 973) q I~l 4 -1.3
- fixed 120) J~ ? 6\ ';!. 4 2,206) .), b 8.2) . 5.6) 3,052) 4,025 , .0.... }
Post Office Savings Bank - demand 647) ii2? 14.0) 20 0 2 974) 2 ~-1 ~:~: 8.8 5 -10.4) -11 2 850) ~ 5.5 5 7 7
- fixed 276) , ~ 6.0) . 1,417) ,J';! -0.8) . 1,385) 2,2J5 -J.J
Finance Companies - demand 22) 99 0.5) 2 1 10 543) 7 70 7 2.0) 12 2 3 1. 5) 10.1 1,217) 5,006 12.2 7 0
- fixed 7..,1 1. 7) . .., .., .. ) J,J . 10.2) . 8.5) 3,789) J,1 / J L, :64
Building Societies - demand 101) 207 2.2) .. 6 565) 1 72" 2.ll .- 7 -o.ll 0.5 692) 1--2 4 ii 6 0
- fixed 2.2) 4.4 763) ,J 0 ? ,.) 4. ';! 1,300) ,';!';!1021 J .... 0 0.6) N
Stock and Station Agents - demand 48) .- 1. 0) 84) 0.3) O. -0.7) 73) w
- fixed 18) 6/ 0.4) 1.5 11 89) 173 0.3) .b 11 -0.1) -0.9 135) 208 0.5 11 -0.1
Official Money Market - demand 38) ~B 0.2) 1 0 12 51) 58 0.2) 0 2 13 ~~:~; -0.8 (6)(net) - fixed 10) j 0.2) . 7) (5)) . (6)
COlllmercial Bill Market (net) 1 (4) (5) 13 768 2.8 9 2 ,. 1,368 '7 '7 7 +0.5.0 J.J
Life Insurance Offices 1,219 26.5 1 5,325 19.7 2 -6.8 6,417 15.7 2 -4.0
Central Government Stock (3) 143 3.1 9 1,561 5.8 6 2.7 1,249 3.0 8 -2.8
Local Authority Stock (3) 180 3.9 7
--.tl 0.3 12 -3.6 --l1 ~ 12 -0.1
TOTAL 4,608 100.0 27,058 100.0 - 40,980 100.0
of which: demand 2,098 45.5 7,240 26.8 -18.7 10,035 24.5 -2.3
fixed 2,510 54.5 19,818 73.2 lB.7 30,945 75.5 +2.3
Notes:
(l) Wherever possible double counting has been avoided by using data that have been adjusted for deposits which institutions hold with each other.
(2) Or closest balance date to 31 March.
(3) Excludes holdings by government and private sector entities and by financial institutions.
(4) Author's estimate.
(5) Not significant.
(6) Official short term money market ceased to exist in 1986.
Sources: Department of Statistics, Monthly Abstract of Statistics, various.
Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Bulletin, various.
Rpoi"trar of Ilui lrlinn C:o... i"ti,,<: Annll:lJ R"nnrt U:lrinllC
<ig 7 ' 3,737l 17,104
. ,0 13,367)
. )
,',
7' ' ' 1. 5) .0
B 9. 7 B 4,0252 6) 0 B. 3,052)
<i2? 7q 3.6) 8.B 2,235
. , 5.2) O H 1,385)
22) 99 0.5) 2.1 7 2.0) 12.21. 7) ./
4.4 9 692) 1,992 q2.2) 2 8) 1,300)
. W/7 0.618) 01 0.3)
) 38 O.B) 1.0 0.2) 0.2 -0.6) -0.810) . ) ( )) -0.2)
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Table 7: Distribution of Funding of M3 Institutions, Selected Years(l)
As at 31 March (2) 1981 Share 1984 Share 1987 Share 1988 Share
of M3 of M3 of M3 of M3
$m % $m % $m % $m %
Notes and Coins (3) 544 4.2 652 3.3 868 2.3 846 1.9
Transaction Account Balances (4)
Registered Banks 1,930 14.8 2,567 13.0 3,737 9.9 4,998 11.2
Savings Institutions 98 0.7 217 1.1 531 1.4 1,608 3.6
Less Inter-Institutional Transactions
Balances and Government Deposits 86 - 142 - 178 - 150
Ml 2,486 3,289 4,598 7,302
Other Funds N
Registered Banks 5,522 42.2 7,625 38.5 15,362 40.6 23,534 52.6 oj:::.
Financial Corporations 2,432 18.6 5,196 26.3 13,088 34.6 10,483 23.4
Savings Institutions 4,463 34.1 6,363 32.2 8,351 22.1 8,606 19.2
Less Other Inter-Institutional
Funding and Government Deposits 1,831 2,692 - 3,966 - 5,166
M3 13,072 19,781 37,793 43,136
Notes:
(1) Institutions covered are the Reserve Bank, registered banks, stock and station agents, finance companies,
merchant banks, the Rural bank, building societies, PostBank, savings banks, and the Public Service Investment
Society.
(2) Or closest balance date to 31 March. First data available are for 1981.
(3) Notes and coins on issue from the Reserve Bank minus till money of the registered banks.
(4) Balances that are subject to chequing or "EFT-POS' facilities, or in sweep accounts.
Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Bulletin, various issues.
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Another interesting observation is that the share of
notes and coin in M3 has declined in each of the years
included in the table. This probably reflects greater use
of electronic funds transfer facilities and is not likely to
be a direct result of financial market liberalisation.
Changes in the composition of advances (or "claims") are
set out in Tables 8 and 9. In Table 8 data relate to M3
institutions as defined prior to liberalisation. In Table 9
data relate to M3 institutions as they are presently
defined. The latter definition includes more types of
financial institution than the former (see notes to each
table).
It is clear from Table 8 that the share of government in
total claims fell substantially between 1970 and 1984. This
was more than offset by a rise in the share of the private
sector. It is also apparent from the table that trading
banks experienced a substantial proportional rise in claims
on both government and the private sector. In contrast,
savings banks experienced a decline in their claims on
government as a proportion of total claims. The change in
savings banks' claims on government mainly reflects: (i)
steady reduction of the required reserve ratios for private
savings banks and trustee banks between 1970 and 1980; and
(ii) growth in the trading banks' balance sheets.
The most significant ch~nge in the data in Table 8
between 1984 and 1987 was the increase in Reserve Bank
holdings of government securities. This was a reflection of
the emphasis placed on open market operations after the
change of government in 1984.
1970 1984
As at 31 March(2) Amount Share Amount Share
Claims on: $m % $m %
Government
Reserve Bank(3) -63 - -384I
Trading banks(4) 32 1.1 2,948 11.2
Savings banks(5) 1,504 50.2 3,191 12.1
Coins in circulation 19 0.6 75 0.3
Other M3 institutions(5)
-11 2.5 442 -.h1
Total Gover-n1nent 1,567 52.3 6,272 23.8
Marketing and Stabilisation(6) 181 6.0 1,405 5.3
Private Sector
Trading banks 667 22.2 10,058 38.1
Savings banks 155 5.2 3,267 12.4
Other M3 institutions 247 8.2 4,813 18.2
Total Private Sector 1,069 35.6 18,137 68.7
Overseas (7)
Reserve Bank 98 3.3 319 1.2
Trading banks 91 3.0 429 1.6
Other -5 - -178
Total Overseas 183 6.1 571 2.2
TOTAL 2,999 100.0 26,385 100.0
Change in
Share 1970-84
% points
10.1
-38.1
-0.3
-0.8
-28.5
-0.7
15.9
7.2
10.0
33.1
-2.1
-1.4
-3.9
1987
Amount Share
$m %
-
1,188 3.7
3,541 11.0
2,623 8.2
83 0.3
471 1.5
7,906 24.6
-40
14,142 44.0
4,015 12.5
5,764 17.9
23,922 74.4
331 1.0
397 1.2
-353
375 1.2
--
32,163 100.0
Change in
Share 1984-87
% points
-0.2
-3.9
o
-0.2
0.8
5.9
0.1 N
-0.3 0')
5.7
-0.2
-0.4
-
-1.0
Notes:
(1) Institutions covered are the Reserve Bank, trading banks, savings banks, stock and station agents, finance companies
and official short-term money market dealers.
(2) Or closest balance date to 31 March.
(3) Reserve Bank holdings of Government securities (at book value) and New Zealand coins plus advances to the State less
Government deposits.
(4) Trading bank holdings of Government securities (at book value) and New Zealand coins less Government deposits.
(5) Holdings of Government securities (at book value).
(6) Reserve Bank advances and discounts to marketing organisations plus certain export credits, less marketing deposits
and stabilisation deposits at Reserve Bank.
(7) Overseas claims are defined as foreign assets less all foreign liabilities (excluding shareholders funds). •Other ,
represents estimated claims of finance companies.
Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Bulletin, various issues.
-1 -.L.Q
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In Table 9 data on the distribution of claims based on
the current definition of M3 are presented. The data reveal
a substantial increase in the share of private sector credit
in domestic credit between 1984 and 1988 and a decrease in
the share of government credit. The increase in the shares
of private sector credit by registered banks is consistent
with that for trading banks in Table 8.
It is noteworthy that the increase in the share of
private sector credit between 1984 and 1987 in Table 9 is
much larger than the increase recorded for the total private
sector in Table 8. The difference between the tables is
that Table 9 includes more institutions than Table 8.
It is also clear from Table 9 that savings institutions
have reduced their holdings of government securities. This
reflects removal of compulsory reserve ratios in February
1985 and a reallocation of some savings institutions to the
registered banks category.
To complete this discussion it would be useful to
briefly comment on some of the effects of the removal of
foreign exchange controls that occurred in late 1984.
Unfortunately, there are insufficient data available prior
to April 1987 that would enable some assessment of the
effects on funding and claims of financial institutions of
this part of the liberalisation policy. Some of the data
that are available are presented in Table 10. Comparing
June 1988 to April 1987, there was a small reduction in the
proportion of foreign currency funding for registered banks
and increases for savings institutions and financial
corporations and small increases in the proportion of
foreign currency claims for all three groups of
institutions. It is possible that larger increases in
foreign currency funding and claims occurred in 1985 and
1986 and that some sort of "equilibrium" between foreign and
domestic currency balance sheet items has now been
established.
Finally, the reduction in claims on marketing and
stabilisation schemes reflects the abolition of Reserve Bank
funding of various agricultural marketing boards.
fable 9:
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Distribution of Claims of M3 Institutions, Selected Years(l)
1981 Share 1984 Share 1987 Share 1988 Share
~s at 31 March(2) of DC of DC of DC of DC
koss Claims on: $m % $m % $m % $m %
::lrivate Sector
Registered Banks 5,148 33.1 7,497 29.5 16,343 36.5 25,906 50.1
Financial Corporations 4,104 26.4 7,916 31.2 15,839 35.3 13,727 26.9
Savings Institutions 2,606 16.7 3,854 15.2 6,787 15.1 8,931 17.5
Reserve Bank 4 n.s. 10 n.s. 20 n.s. 24 n.s.
~ess Inter-Institutional Claims 1,124 1,657 2,817 5,238
::lrivate Sector Credit 10,738 69.0 17,620 69.4 36,172 80.7 43,350 84.8
lJarketing and Stabilisation(3) 600 3.9 1,006 4.0 -40 -69
~overnment
Registered Banks(4) 1,857 11. 9 2,819 11.1 3,798 8.5 4,340 8.5
Financial Corporations(5) 301 1.9 859 3.4 1,284 2.9 1,846 1.7
Savings Institutions(5) 2,097 13.5 3,139 12.4 2,346 5.2 1,614 3.2
Reserve Bank(6) -75 -126 1,188 2.6 1,928 1.8
Coins in Circulation 45 0.3 62 0.2 83 0.2 97 0.2
~overnment Credit 4,225 27.1 6,753 26.7 8,699 19.4 7,825 15.3
)omestic Credit(7) 15,563 25,379 44,831 51,106
~otes:
1.S. =not significant
:1) Institutions covered are the Reserve Bank, registered banks, stock and station
agents, finance companies, merchant banks, the Rural Bank, building societi~s,
PostBank, savings banks, and the Public Service Investment Society.
:2) Or closest balance date to 31 March. First data available are for 1981.
:3) Reserve Bank advances and discounts to marketing organisations plus certain export
credits, less marketing stabilisation deposits at Reserve Bank.
:4) Registered Banks' holdings of Government securities (at book value) and New
Zealand coins, less Government deposits.
:5) Holdings of Government securities (at book value).
:6) Reserve Bank holdings of Government securities (at book value) and New Zealand
coins plus advances to the state less Government deposits.
:7) Domestic credit equals the sum of the claims of 'selected financial institutions'
on the three sectors of the domestic economy, Government, marketing and
stabilisation, and private sector. Abbreviated as "DC" in column headings.
,ource: Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Bulletin, various issues.
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Table 10: New Zealand Dollar and Foreign Currency Funding and Claims,
1987 and 1988
Funding Claims
As at end of: Amount Share of Amount Share of
Total Total
$m % $m %
April 1987
Registered Banks
- NZ dollar 19,788 89.4 16,788 89.7
- Foreign CUrl'ency 2,354 10.6 1,925 10.3
- Total 22,142 100.0 18,713 100.0
Financial Corporations
- NZ dollar 13,057 73.8 16,556 84.1
- Foreign currency 4,625 26.2 3,132 15.1
- Total 17,682 100.0 19,688 100.0
Savings Institutions
- NZ dollar 9,002 94.9 7,163 93.0
- Foreign currency 485 5.1 542 7.0
- Total 9,487 100.0 7,705 100.0
June 1988
Registered Banks
- NZ dollar 29,491 88.8 26,060 89.8
- Foreign currency 3,729 11.2 2,954 10.2
- Total 33,220 100.0 29,014 100.0
Financial Corporations
- NZ dollar 9,740 74.3 13,412 89.3
- Foreign currency 3,375 25.3 1,607 10.7
- Total 13,115 100.0 15,019 100.0
Savings Institutions
- NZ dollar 10,664 95.8 9,307 95.1
- Foreign currency 473 4.2 481 4.9
- Total 11,137 100.0 9,788 100.0
Note: Inter,~institutional transactions have not been netted out in this
table.
Source: Compiled from Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Bulletin, Vol.51, No.3,
1988, Tables Dl and D2.
curt'e

CHAPTER 4
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The discussion in this paper has been deliberately
selective so as not to cover too much of the ground already
covered by other students of financial market deregulation
in New Zealand.
In Section 2 it was suggested that, prior to the
election in 1984, there were pressures for liberalisation at
both the economic and political levels. The events
surrounding the Prices and Wages Freeze of 1982 to 1984 and
the election in 1984 probably served to increase the speed
of regulatory reform.
Already, some effects of deregulation are apparent.
Relevant conclusions from Section 3 of this paper include:
(a) Financial deepening has occurred since 1984;
(b) Some reintermediation occurred after mid-1984;
(c) Market concentration in the financial services
industry has not altered markedly;
(d) Profits of financial institutions have generally
increased since 1984 but, when expressed as a
percentage of total tangible assets, profits have
not altered much except for finance companies; and
(e) There have been some significant changes in
institutional shares of deposits and advances.
In conclusion, it is worth emphasising that deregulation
in the New Zealand financial services industry has occurred
at a very fast speed since 1984. New Zealand now probably
has the least regulated financial market in the world. It
is only four years since the market was shackled by
pervasive direct controls and it is probably safe to say
that the effects of liberalisation have by no means worked
themselves out yet. Tracking the effects of liberalisation
as the market evolves over the next few years will be a
fascinating academic challenge.
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